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As performance accountabilities, external oversight, and market competition
among not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals have grown, governing boards have been
given a more central leadership role. This article examines these boards’ effec-
tiveness, particularly how their configuration influenced a range of performance
outcomes in NFP community hospitals. Results indicate that hospitals gov-
erned by boards using a corporate governance model, versus hospitals governed
by philanthropic-style boards, were likely to be more efficient and have more
admissions and a larger share of the local market. Occupancy and cash flow
were generally unrelated to hospitals’ governing board configuration. How-
ever, effects of governance configuration were more pronounced in freestanding
and public NFP hospitals compared with system-affiliated and private NFP
hospitals, respectively.
Keywords: Governance, not-for-profit hospitals, performance.
The fundamental fiduciary duty of thegoverning boards of not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals is toensure the organization’s fidelity to its core mission. Because
this broad charge has been subject to different interpretations by the
legal system, regulators, and the boards themselves, it has led to wide
variation in how hospitals’ governance responsibilities are discharged
and their boards are structured (Alexander, Weiner, and Bogue 2001).
Such loose interpretations of “good” governance were tolerable in an era
when hospital boards and the hospitals they governed were not held
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rigorously to account for their performance. But current conditions
are likely to be less tolerant of ineffective governance, especially as
boards attempt to balance the complex and often divergent demands
of regulations, market forces, community expectations, and various
organizational stakeholders (Alexander 2004; Carver 1997; Robilotti
and Rosner 2004).
Several recent developments highlight the importance of effective
governance to NFP hospitals. In the past decade, the tax-exempt status
of NFP hospitals has increasingly been challenged, as political and com-
munity leaders try to hold these hospitals accountable for their commu-
nity benefit responsibilities (Burns 2004; Lee, Chen, and Weiner 2004;
Owens 2005). For example, nineteen states have enacted laws requiring
NFP hospitals to report on their community benefit activities and/or
to provide charity services linked to community needs (Catholic Health
Association 2006). NFP hospitals also are faced with changing payment
mechanisms, including a movement toward pay-for-performance that
has been strongly endorsed by the Bush administration (Rosenthal et al.
2005).
In addition, the trend toward external oversight of hospitals’ board
structure and conduct has been escalating, particularly after the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act was passed in 2002 (Greene 2005; Hymowitz 2005). Al-
though this act applies only to investor-owned corporations, it has af-
fected the board practices of various NFP organizations. For example, in
response to alleged financial mismanagement by hospital executives, a
proposed bill in Rhode Island (RI SB 2745) is attempting to lead the
state toward greater transparency in health care public reporting. The
IRS also has announced the development of its 2006 Exempt Organiza-
tions Implementing Guidelines, which signal its increased attention to
the behavior of NFP hospitals (Internal Revenue Service 2005).
Greater external regulation/oversight of nonprofit board practices and
market performance pressure on NFP hospitals will likely pressure NFP
boards to produce “results.” Amid these heightened expectations, how-
ever, is concern whether governing boards are prepared to assume these
added responsibilities and take the lead in improving NFP hospitals’
performance (Golden and Zajac 2001; Orlikoff 2005). The governance
structure and practice of NFP hospitals appear to vary a great deal across
the United States, with some boards emphasizing or interpreting their
roles differently than others (Orlikoff 2005; Weil 2003). More impor-
tant, there has been little empirical study of what constitutes effective
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governance for nonprofit organizations and thus little evidence that
would provide a basis for improving NFP hospitals’ governance practices.
This article uses a conceptual model of NFP hospital governance
archetypes to investigate the relationship between governance configu-
ration and a set of “scorecard” indicators of hospital performance. Because
the health care field is being pressured to produce results in several per-
formance domains, it is important to identify those governance practices
in hospitals that promote organizational viability and performance. Only
in this manner can the best practices for NFP hospital governance be
specified. These results will also help inform the specification of exter-
nally imposed standards on NFP hospital governance in order to fit such
standards to these organizations.
Background
By far the most widely discussed topic in the NFP hospital governance
literature is board effectiveness. This literature tends to be dominated by
prescriptive or normative recommendations for changes in governance
process, composition, and functions based on the “hands-on experience”
of either hospital managers or consultants or both (Nadler 2004; Orlikoff
2005). Other authors have proposed theoretical models of effective gov-
ernance (Green and Griesinger 1996; Herman and Renz 2004; Pointer
and Orlikoff 2002). Unfortunately, however, neither the prescriptive nor
the theoretical work has received much rigorous and systematic empiri-
cal verification. Furthermore, the few empirical studies in this area have
produced incomplete or inconclusive results regarding the influence of
governance characteristics on performance (Prybil et al. 2005).
The lack of conclusive evidence can be traced to fundamental dis-
agreements over the strategic role of governing boards (Dalton and
Dalton 2005). For example, some observers view boards as ineffectual
in organizational decisions because they serve only as links to the exter-
nal environment, acquiring resources and playing legitimacy-enhancing,
rather than strategic, roles in organizations (Pfeffer 1972; Westphal and
Zajac 1998). Others suggest that boards offer internal oversight by mon-
itoring management’s performance, checking managerial opportunism,
and ensuring the consideration of stakeholders’ interests (Barnard 1991;
Coffee 1994; Jensen 1989; Kosnik 1987). According to this view, hospi-
tal boards influence organizational performance only in crisis conditions
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or indirectly through the selection or termination of management.
Finally, some observers maintain that boards exercise independent con-
trol over strategic change through their role as policymakers, ratifiers, or
advisers to top management (Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990; Baysinger,
Kosnik, and Turk 1991; Davis and Thompson 1994; Finkelstein and
Hambrick 1996). Empirically, these wide-ranging viewpoints have led
to differences in both the characteristics of boards considered to be im-
portant drivers of hospital performance (e.g., insider versus outsider rep-
resentation) and the indicators of performance relevant to those charac-
teristics (e.g., financial measures, community benefit, market share).
In sum, the main difficulty of assessing the relationship between gov-
ernance and hospital performance is the ambiguity of the board’s role and
the general functions of governance. This ambiguity is even more acute
for nonprofit boards, which must meet the needs of various stakeholders
when carrying out the organization’s mission. In practice, the author-
ity and responsibility of hospital governing boards in internal decision
making are badly defined. The boards of some NFP hospitals are active
in policy and program development, but other boards perform largely
ceremonial functions, delegating or abdicating much decision-making
authority to the chief executive officer, to the medical staff, or to one
or two very active board members (Morlock, Nathanson, and Alexander
1988; Prybil 1980). Accordingly, to evaluate the role of governance in
NFP hospital performance, we must identify a model that conceptual-
izes and measures differences in the roles and behaviors of NFP hospital
boards.
Philanthropic and Corporate Models
of Hospital Governance
Increasingly, organizational scholars view organizations and, by exten-
sion, governing boards as a configuration of interconnected components
rather than a set of independent elements separate from one another
(Meyer, Tsui, and Hinings 1993; Rediker and Seth 1995). Organization
configurations have a thematic focus and a close alignment of elements
serving that focus. Using the configuration logic, over the past two
decades, the health care literature has distinguished between the corpo-
rate model and the philanthropic model as two ideal types of hospital
governance (Alexander, Morlock, and Gifford 1988; Delbecq and Gill
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TABLE 1
Philanthropic and Corporate Models of Hospital Governing Boards
Philanthropic Model Corporate Model
Large board size Small board size













No limit to consecutive terms for
board members
Limit to consecutive terms for
board members
No compensation for board service Compensation provided for board
Emphasis on asset preservation service
Emphasis on strategic activity
Source: J.A. Alexander, L.L. Morlock, and B.D. Gifford, The Effects of Corporate Restructuring on
Hospital Policymaking, Health Services Research 23 (2)(1988):311.
1988; Shortell 1989; Weiner and Alexander 1993). Table 1 describes the
attributes characterizing and differentiating these models.
Each model reflects distinctly different values and organizing prin-
ciples. The philanthropic model stresses community participation, due
process, and stewardship, whereas the corporate model stresses strategy
development, risk taking, and competitive positioning. These differ-
ent values are supported and reinforced by configurations of governance
attributes. For example, the philanthropic model’s large size, diverse
membership, and absence of term limits support and reinforce the in-
clusion of a broad range of perspectives and the continuity of institu-
tional values and traditions. By contrast, the corporate model’s small
size, narrow membership, and use of term limits support and reinforce
a streamlined, focused, strategic decision-making process. Each model
therefore displays logical and functional interdependencies that are not
adequately captured by focusing on a single feature of governance (e.g.,
insider representation) or by looking at multiple governance attributes
independently of one another (Weiner and Alexander 1993).
Governance scholars suggest that the corporate board model is
more strategically adaptive due to its smaller size, streamlined
decision-making structure, and greater integration with management
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(Delbecq and Gill 1988; Kovner 1990; Shortell 1989). In comparison
with the philanthropic board model, corporate boards may also be more
risk aggressive and growth oriented and therefore be more likely to ini-
tiate far-reaching organizational changes (Fennell and Alexander 1989).
These claims have been empirically tested and indicate that hospitals
with a corporate model of governance responded more rapidly to chang-
ing environmental conditions through strategies such as merger, acqui-
sition, diversification, and multihospital system affiliation (Alexander
et al. 2006). Less explored, however, is the impact of the hospital’s gov-
erning board configuration on its performance.
Hospital Governance Configurations
and Organizational Performance
We argue that different governing board configurations will be related
to differences in the performance of NFP hospitals. This proposition is
consistent with the configurational view of organizations, which main-
tains that there is complementarity among structure, strategy, and per-
formance. Furthermore, we expect the relationship between the board’s
configuration and performance to hold after controlling for other struc-
tural and environmental variables (e.g., hospital size, location, market
structure).
Specifically, philanthropic-model boards are likely to act like boards
of trustees, concerned primarily with preserving the assets of NFP hospi-
tals and acting as fiduciary agents for the community rather than instru-
ments of hospital strategy. Because of their focus on asset preservation
and lack of strategic orientation, we believe that philanthropic-model
boards will be less responsive to competitive pressures and less prone
to develop strategies leading to positive performance. Corporate-model
boards, in contrast, are more likely to emphasize establishing overall
policy direction (Alexander, Morlock, and Gifford 1988; Ritvo 1980).
They are more likely to be concerned with the hospital’s competitive po-
sition and with facilitating changes to enhance the hospital’s operational
efficiency, market standing, and financial viability. Accordingly, we ex-
pect the corporate-model board to have a higher probability of positively
influencing the hospital’s performance across a number of domains.
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Methods
We employed a longitudinal design with pooled cross-sectional data
to test the hypotheses (Menard 1991). The data were pooled from two
hospital governance surveys conducted in 1985 and 1989, including ob-
servations for three groups of NFP community hospitals. The first group
was NFP hospitals that responded to both the 1985 and 1989 gover-
nance surveys (n = 1,907); the second group contained NFP hospitals
responding to the 1985 governance survey only (n = 1,043); and the third
group was NFP hospitals responding to the 1989 governance survey only
(n = 950). Inclusion of all three groups of hospitals, despite their varying
presence during the study period, maximized the amount of information
we used in this study. Our analysis used indicators of governance con-
figuration in 1985 and 1989, along with the hospitals’ organizational
and environmental characteristics and baseline performance, to explain
the average performance of hospitals between 1986 and 1989 and be-
tween 1990 and 1993, respectively. The controls for organizational and
environmental variables and the use of the lag structure that established
the temporal order of the predictors and the dependent variable helped
enhance the causal tests of the hypotheses.
Data
The two surveys on hospital governance were conducted by the American
Hospital Association’s (AHA) Hospital Research and Educational Trust.
The survey was sent to the CEOs of all U.S. community hospitals, who
were asked to complete the questionnaire in collaboration with key board
members (e.g., board chairperson). The response rates to the two surveys
were approximately equal at 57 percent, although fewer responded in
both data collection periods. We also used three other sources of data.
The Area Resources File (Bureau of Health Professions) provided annual
data on county-level demographic, health care resource, and economic
characteristics. The AHA Annual Survey of Hospitals (1985–1994) sup-
plied information about hospital size, system membership, and owner-
ship type. The Medicare cost reports (1985–1994) were the source of
data for the hospitals’ financial performance.
To assess representativeness of the study sample, we used t- and
chi-square tests to compare the sample with the populations of NFP
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community hospitals in 1985 and 1989 on the basis of size (based on
the number of beds), affiliation with a multihospital system, teaching
status, and rural/urban location. The results showed that the sample
was comparable to the NFP hospital population on teaching status and
rural/urban location. However, large hospitals and hospitals with no af-
filiation with a multihospital system were overrepresented in the sample,
so our research findings should be generalized with caution to the entire
NFP community hospital population.
Given the changes in the health care environment over the last two
decades, the age of the data and the limitations this places on the current
application of our research findings are a concern. Nonetheless, our goal
was to test a theoretically based model that explains the relationship
between a hospital’s board configuration and its performance. This gov-
ernance model and the performance measures we used are not specific to
a particular period.
Measures
Hospital Performance. We assessed five indicators of operational,
strategic, and financial performance: efficiency, occupancy, adjusted ad-
missions, market share, and cash flow. Efficiency was defined as the ratio
of total expenses ($1000s) to statistical beds. Occupancy meant the ra-
tio of average daily census to statistical beds. Adjusted admissions were
the sum of inpatient admissions and equivalent admissions attributed to
outpatient services. This adjustment was necessary in order to standard-
ize the assessment of performance among NFP hospitals that differed in
their strategic emphasis on inpatient and outpatient care. Market share
indicated the percentage of total adjusted admissions in the county at-
tributable to the focal NFP hospital. Cash flow, an important indicator
of NFP hospitals’ short- and long-term development and survival, was
calculated as the ratio of net assets and depreciation to total assets.
To smooth out unavoidable short-term variations in hospital perfor-
mance, we constructed all the operational and financial performance
indicators as an average over a four-year period. A one-year lag was cre-
ated to ensure that all predictors, including governance configuration
(the main predictor of interest), preceded the performance indicators. In
other words, we used the predictors in 1985 to explain the differences in
sample hospitals’ average performance between 1986 and 1989 and the
predictors in 1989 to explain differences in average performance between
1990 and 1993.
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Several of the performance indicators, such as adjusted admissions and
market share, were significantly influenced by the size of the hospital. For
example, larger hospitals, with more hospital beds and higher staffing
levels, were more likely to admit and treat more patients than were
smaller hospitals. Accordingly, a variable indicating hospital bed size
was incorporated in the model to control for differences in hospital size.
Governance Configuration. The main predictor was governance
configuration—an interval variable that measured the degree to which
a NFP hospital’s governing board conformed to the corporate model of
governance. We used profile analysis to assess the degree of similarity
between an NFP hospital’s board and the corporate model (Doty, Glick,
and Huber 1993; Drazin and Van de Ven 1985; Young, Beekun, and
Ginn 1992). Like cluster analysis and other taxonomic procedures, pro-
file analysis captures the integrated conception of governance expressed
in the corporate-philanthropic governance typology. Experts prefer pro-
file analytic techniques for modeling organizational typologies because
the analytic approach is more consistent with the logical structure of
typological theories (Doty and Glick 1994; Doty, Glick, and Huber
1993). In contrast to taxonomic analysis, profile analysis models ideal
types as organizational forms that might exist rather than as categories
of organizations that actually exist. Thus, we treated ideal types like the
corporate governance model as theoretical constructs rather than empir-
ical descriptions of boards.
Measuring the corporate governance configuration through profile
analysis was accomplished through two sequential steps. First, we con-
structed an ideal profile of the corporate model through close study of the
literature. We obtained theoretically specified values from the literature
for six of the eight characteristics of the corporate model shown in table 1
(Doty and Glick 1994; Doty, Glick, and Huber 1993). We measured five
characteristics on a binary scale and set them equal to one to reflect the
attributes of the corporate model: CEO role on the board, formal CEO
evaluation, board member term limits, board member compensation,
and focus on strategic activity (see appendix for descriptions of these
items). In the case of board size, the health care literature suggests seven
as the ideal size for a corporate-model board (Delbecq and Gill 1988;
Shortell 1989). While the literature provided theoretical justification
for distinguishing corporate and philanthropic models in regard to in-
sider representation and occupational heterogeneity, it did not identify
optimal levels or values for these continuous variables. Therefore, we set
the profile values for these characteristics to be equal to the mean scores
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reflected in a sample of hospitals scoring in the first percentile for the
corporate ideal type for the six theoretically specified board attributes
(cf. Drazin and Van de Ven 1985; Venkatraman and Prescott 1990).
This strategy for obtaining empirically specified profile values maxi-
mized the advantages of the theoretical approach to multivariate profile
construction (Doty and Glick 1994). The values were 0.14 for insider
representation and 0.27 for occupational diversity.
In the second step, we assessed the similarity of an NFP hospital’s
governance configuration to the quantitative profile of the corporate
model by computing Gower’s coefficient.1 We used Gower’s coefficient
instead of the more familiar Euclidean distance coefficient because we
measured the board characteristics on binary, ratio, and interval scales.
Gower’s coefficient permits the use of variables on different measurement
scales in the estimation of similarity (Kaufman and Rousseeuw 1990).
Board attributes were equally weighted, since the literature did not
offer a compelling rationale for differentially weighting board character-
istics. With the computation of Gower’s coefficient, each NFP hospital
received a value from zero to one, indicating the degree to which its
governance configuration resembled the profile for the corporate model.
Heuristically, Gower’s coefficient of similarity can be interpreted like
a Pearson correlation coefficient. A higher value of the Gower’s coeffi-
cient indicates greater resemblance of the hospital board’s governance
configuration to the corporate model.
Organizational and Environmental Conditions. We incorporated in the
analysis five organizational control variables (size, ownership, teaching
status, system affiliation, and institutional ties with accrediting orga-
nizations, national associations, and insurance groups) and three envi-
ronmental control variables (rural location, market competition, and per
capita income). Studies showed that these covariates were correlated with
both governance structure and performance in hospitals (Alexander and
Amburgey 1987; Gautam and Goodstein 1996; Goodstein and Boeker
1991; Halpern, Alexander, and Fennell 1992; Lee and Alexander 1999),
so we included these covariates to account for alternative explanations
of the relationship between governance configuration and performance.
Hospital size (in 100s) was measured by the number of hospital beds set
up and staffed. Ownership was represented by one dummy variable—
public NFP—with the private NFP serving as the reference category.
Teaching status was measured according to whether or not the hospital
provided an internship or residency training program (1 if the hospital
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did and 0 otherwise). System affiliation indicated whether the hospital
was a member of a multihospital system (1 yes and 0 no). Institutional
ties measured the number of the hospital’s affiliations with well-known
accrediting organizations, national associations, and insurance groups.
Rural location was measured according to whether the hospital was
located in a nonmetropolitan county. Using a county-based market def-
inition, market competition was measured by 1 minus the Herfindahl
index (the sum of the squared market share of all community hospitals in
the county) (Phibbs and Robinson 1993). A higher value of this variable
indicated that the market was less concentrated and more competitive.
Per capita income (in $10Ks) was the average income of county residents.
Finally, we included in the model the baseline hospital performances
in 1985 and 1989 in order to reduce potential endogeneity in the analysis
(i.e., the structure of hospital governance may change as a result of antic-
ipated performance downturns). The indicator of baseline performance
in each model was measured as the dependent variable in that model for
the baseline year. For example, occupancy in 1985 was included in the
model that predicted the average occupancy between 1986 and 1989.
All covariates and baseline performance variables were measured at two
time points, 1985 and 1989. Table 2 presents a summary of the measures
and descriptive statistics for all study variables.
Analysis
Because all the dependent variables were interval scaled, linear regression
modeling was employed. Where appropriate (in the case of efficiency,
adjusted admissions, and market share), we normalized the dependent
variable and the baseline performance indicator using log transformation.
Our data contained repeated observations for some of the sample hospi-
tals. Such repeated observations may bias the estimates because the error
terms are correlated, thus violating the required assumption of indepen-
dence among observations (Zeger and Liang 1992). In general, ignoring
such correlations leads to lower standard errors and thus an overestimated
significance of covariate effects. To account for such correlations, we em-
ployed the generalized estimating equations (GEE) approach (Zeger and
Liang 1992). GEE controls for within-subject correlation by separat-
ing its effects from the estimation of regression coefficients and yields
consistent estimates of parameters (Zeger and Liang 1992).
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Results
The mean of the corporate governance configuration measure for the
entire sample was 0.44 (SD = 0.14) in 1985 and 0.47 (SD = 0.14)
in 1989, with a range of 0.11 to 1.00. For the panel of hospitals with
governance data in both periods of the study, the mean of the corporate
governance configuration measure was 0.45 (SD = 0.14) in 1985 and
0.48 (SD = 0.14) in 1989 (statistics not shown). Intuitively, one would
expect private NFP hospital boards to conform more closely to the cor-
porate governance configuration than public NFP hospital boards do.
Indeed, our results supported this expectation. The mean of the corpo-
rate governance configuration measure was 0.48 (SD = 0.14) in private
NFP hospitals and 0.39 (SD = 0.13) in public NFP hospitals. These
results also indicate only incremental change in NFP boards’ adoption
of the corporate governance model over the study period and show that
in practice most hospitals employ a hybrid form of the ideal governance
models.
Table 3 presents the results of hypothesis testing. The coefficients
of corporate governance configuration are consistently positive across
the models for the five different performance indicators. Three of the
coefficients are statistically significant at p < 0.05. Specifically, NFP
hospitals whose governance configuration conformed more closely to the
corporate model displayed greater efficiency (β = 0.067, standard error
[SE] = 0.022, p < 0.01), had a greater number of admissions (β = 0.225,
SE = 0.060, p < 0.001), and achieved a larger share of the local market
(β = 0.040, SE = 0.011, p < 0.001). The associations of governance
configuration and occupancy and cash flow did not achieve statistical
significance, controlling for other covariates in the model.
As expected, baseline performance was related to the four-year aver-
age hospital performance, except for the case of cash flow. The result
may be due to the high level of volatility in hospital cash flow, which
also may explain the lack of relationship between governance configu-
ration and cash flow. Hospital size was positively related to efficiency,
occupancy, and cash flow but was negatively associated with adjusted
admissions. Public NFP hospitals had a lower cash flow than did private
NFP hospitals. Teaching NFP hospitals had greater adjusted admissions
but a lower cash flow compared with their nonteaching counterparts.
Hospitals with more institutional ties had a higher market share and
a greater cash flow. Market competition was positively related to cash
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flow, and per capita income in the county was negatively related to cash
flow. NFP hospitals in rural areas, compared with those in urban ar-
eas, had a greater share of the local market. System affiliation was not
significantly associated with any of the performance indicators. Finally,
the coefficients of the time-effect variable suggest that the sample NFP
hospitals had greater efficiency, adjusted admissions, and market share
between 1985 and 1989.
As a sensitivity test, we repeated the analysis with two different spec-
ifications of the model: one measured performance in the year after the
predictors were assessed (i.e., a one-year lag) and the other measured
performance two years after the predictors were assessed (i.e., a two-year
lag). The results were similar to those shown in table 3. In all the analy-
ses, corporate governance configuration was positively and significantly
related to efficiency, adjusted admissions, and market share but had no
significant association with occupancy and cash flow. Thus, the results
of the analysis appeared to be reliable, regardless of how the depen-
dent variables were specified, as either four-year averaged performance
or single-year performance with a one- or two-year lag.
Although our analyses largely supported the main hypotheses, these
effects may not pertain equally to all categories of NFP hospitals. For
example, public and private NFP hospitals may differ fundamentally
in both their governance structures and performance goals. Similarly,
the performance objectives of boards of hospitals affiliated with multi-
hospital systems may differ from those of freestanding hospitals (e.g.,
integrating services with other system hospitals). To explore these ques-
tions, we conducted a stratified analysis to examine whether the effects of
governance configuration on performance varied by ownership and sys-
tem affiliation. To do this, we performed a separate regression analysis
for private and public NFP hospitals and for system-affiliated NFP hos-
pitals and freestanding hospitals. The results of these analyses suggested
several notable differences between the two categories of hospitals. As
the results in table 4 show, higher levels of adjusted admissions were
associated with greater correspondence to the corporate governance con-
figuration in private NFP hospitals. For public NFP hospitals, corpo-
rate governance configuration was significantly and positively associated
with three performance indicators: efficiency, adjusted admissions, and
cash flow. Similar differences were noted for system versus freestand-
ing hospitals. The positive effects of corporate governance configura-
tion on performance appeared to apply primarily to freestanding NFP
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hospitals regarding efficiency, occupancy, adjusted admissions, and cash
flow. Governing board configuration was positively associated only with
efficiency for system-affiliated NFP hospitals.
To ascertain whether the effects of board configuration changed over
time, we also stratified the models by time period, conducting one set
of analyses for the period between 1985 and 1988 and the other for
the period between 1989 and 1994. These stratified analyses showed
no consistent pattern of time-variant effects. We further examined the
time-variant pattern using two different specifications of the dependent
variables in each of the two study periods, that is, the performance in
the year after the predictors were assessed (i.e., a one-year lag) and the
performance two years after the predictors were assessed (i.e., a two-year
lag). Of the governance configuration coefficients that were significant,
about an equal number were significant in both periods. These results
suggest no clear evidence that the impact of governance configuration
changed between the 1985 and 1989 periods (results are available from
the authors).
Discussion
Our findings indicated a positive association between more corporate
governance configurations in NFP hospitals, on the one hand, and sev-
eral key hospital performance indicators, on the other. In particular, gov-
erning boards that conformed more closely to the corporate model were
consistently associated with enhanced operational efficiency, higher vol-
ume of adjusted admissions (possibly through the introduction of more
disciplined and business-oriented management principles), and larger
market share (perhaps by using more aggressive marketing strategies,
diversifying hospital services, and building extended referral networks).
These results appeared robust when alternative model specifications and
lag structures were employed. Our findings, however, indicated no sta-
tistically significant relationship between governance configuration and
improved financial performance, as measured by cash flow. It is pos-
sible that statistically significant relationships may be found if other
financial indicators (e.g., return on investment) were available and used
in the analysis. Another possible explanation is that improvements in
marketing, service provision, and network building may require sig-
nificant capital investment and therefore limit the hospital’s cash flow.
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We also did not find a significant relationship between occupancy and
governance configuration in NFP hospitals, perhaps because bed allo-
cation and staffing were primarily managerial, rather than governance,
concerns.
Despite finding positive associations between the corporate gover-
nance configuration and several key performance indicators, a universal
shift to a more corporate model of governance by NFP hospitals may
not be warranted. Indeed, our results also indicate that the relationship
between NFP governance configuration and hospital performance may
depend on the type of hospital. Specifically, public and freestanding NFP
hospitals were more likely to show the effects of governance configura-
tion on performance than were private hospitals or those affiliated with
multihospital systems. Given that governing boards in public NFP hos-
pitals conformed less to the corporate governance model, we suspect that
public hospitals adopting more corporate governance configurations may
differentiate themselves more clearly from their peers, and the impact
on hospital performance may became more pronounced as a result of this
distinction. The differences between freestanding and system-affiliated
NFP hospitals may be explained by the fact that hospital participation
in multihospital systems added a level of complexity to governance, as
hospital trustees were made accountable, or at least responsive, to the
interests and concerns of a superordinate authority. Traditionally, gov-
erning boards focused on the hospital as an institution and the local
community as the accountable entity. Now that a greater proportion of
hospitals, NFP as well as FP, have become part of a multi-institutional
system and network, how such hierarchical and embedded arrangements
may affect hospital governance functions needs further exploration.
Our research considered a range of performance outcomes related to
hospitals’ financial and operational activities. Although this set of per-
formance measures is probably more extensive than those used in most
research on governance effectiveness, it is by no means exhaustive. In-
deed, research on NFP governance performance must acknowledge the
diversity of governance stakeholders and make explicit the perspective
from which performance is being defined and measured. From manage-
ment’s standpoint, board performance may be defined in terms of absence
of interference in hospital operations and board support for management
policies and strategies. From the community’s perspective, performance
may take the form of adequate access to services, provision of charity care,
and maintenance of the institution’s financial viability. From the board’s
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perspective, performance may take the form of the hospital’s survival,
recruitment of competent top management and medical staff, timely
implementation of strategic decisions, and maintenance of relationships
with key external constituencies.
Our study is based on the assumption that NFP hospital governing
boards consist of a series of interconnected and highly interdependent
components rather than a set of independent elements that can be ef-
fectively separated from one another. Our findings document that those
hospital boards conforming more closely to a corporate model of gover-
nance perform better on a variety of outcomes. Corporate governance is
seen as a set of interrelated components that emphasize a small number
of trustees, a focus on highly selected skills or backgrounds of trustees,
tight evaluation/scrutiny of the CEO, greater management participation
on the board, and more emphasis on the hospital’s strategic concerns.
Attention to the gestalt of governance, as opposed to narrowly focusing
on one element (e.g., board size, term limits for board members), may be
necessary in order to make boards more effective. Governing boards, like
organizations themselves, consist of many different elements (e.g., struc-
ture, composition, activities, policies), all of which must work together
as a system to be effective.
Limitations
Several limitations of the study should be noted. First, the hospital gov-
ernance data for this study were based on surveys conducted in the mid-
to late 1980s, and the dependent variables reflected hospital performance
in the period between 1986 and 1994. Accordingly, our findings should
be generalized with caution to NFP hospitals in recent years. Given the
greater emphasis on governing board accountability (e.g., the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002) and challenges to NFP hospitals’ tax-exempt status,
replication of our analysis with recent data will be important. These is-
sues notwithstanding, the goal of our study was to assess the relationship
between board configuration and hospital performance, not to evaluate
the impact of contemporary oversight and accountabilities on board per-
formance. We believe that our data are consistent with this goal and
that our findings are applicable to contemporary health care. Indeed,
other studies have shown that board function and structure have been
remarkably stable over time and that governance is important to ensuring
continuity in the organization’s mission, values, and corporate culture
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(Green and Griesinger 1996; Margolin et al. 2006). Even though condi-
tions in the health care sector have changed, the fundamental question
of how governance affects hospital performance remains salient. Fur-
thermore, recent data indicate that characteristics in our model, such as
board size, term limits, and “insider representation” on hospital boards,
have changed only slightly between 1997 and 2005 and continue to
show wide variation across hospitals (Margolin et al. 2006). Indeed, dis-
cussions in the literature suggest that issues such as board size, term
limits, management role on the board, and oversight stringency are as
important today as they were when our data were collected.
Second, although the response rates to the two governing board surveys
were comparable to other hospital surveys, the hospitals included in the
study sample may not be representative of the NFP hospital population.
To the extent that the response rate and missing data were systematically
related to hospital governance configuration and performance, the results
of our study may be biased.
Third, despite the wide range of performance measures we examined in
this study, we make no claim for comprehensiveness. Important outcomes
such as the NFP hospital’s debt structure, return on investment, quality
of care, charity care, and provision of community benefits should be
assessed in future research in order to present a “balanced scorecard” in
relation to different governance configurations.
Conclusion
We found the corporate model of hospital governance to be associated
with positive NFP hospital performance and little evidence of trade-
offs among various aspects of organizational performance under differ-
ent governance configurations (e.g., efficiency and market share). These
findings represent a modest beginning to answering the question, Does
governance make a difference? The American NFP community hospi-
tal and its related organizational forms are arguably some of the most
complex of all modern organizations. Their attributes stem from factors
such as the hospital’s alleged commitment to meeting the health needs of
the local community, the mutually dependent (and changing) relation-
ship between the hospital and its medical staff, the advances and rapid
obsolescence of medical technology, the mix of professional and tech-
nical personnel necessary to deliver medical care, the highly regulated
Board Configuration and Performance, Nonprofit Hospitals 753
health care environment, and, perhaps most important, the fundamental
changes in the role and mission of hospitals as they confront an increas-
ingly complex and competitive marketplace. While we do not propose
a “one-best” path to the goal of creating a modern and effective model
for hospital governance (Alexander, Lee, and Bazzoli 2003), our findings
support the notion that a key to improving hospital governance is to ad-
vance our understanding of governance from its current normative and
prescriptive foundations to a stage at which scientific findings are the
accepted standard of governance knowledge.
Endnote








where Wijk is a weighting variable valued at 1 when the data for observation j on variable k are
not missing and valued at zero otherwise. In this study, data for observation i are never missing,
since this “observation” represents the ideal profile of either the corporate or the philanthropic
governance type. Sijk is a dissimilarity “score” based on the outcome of the comparison of variable
k across cases i (the ideal profile) and j. In the case of binary variables, Sijk is set equal to 1 if
case j does not match the ideal profile, and it is set equal to zero otherwise. When variable k is
measured on an interval scale, the value of Sijk is given by
Sijk = |xik − xjk|/Rk
where xik is the score of ideal profile on variable k and Rk is the range of variable k. The same
formula is used to compute the value of Sijk when variable k is measured on a ratio scale.
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Appendix
Attributes of Governing Boards
Board Size. The number of members on a hospital’s board.
Occupational Heterogeneity of Board Members. The breadth of occupations
represented on the board is calculated as a percentage of board mem-
bership of each of the fourteen mutually exclusive groups squared and
then summed (similar to the Herfindahl index). The maximum value
of the index is one if the entire board consists of a single occupational
group. Smaller values indicate a more heterogeneous board. Occupa-
tional categories assessed were physicians, other health professionals,
hospital CEO, religious, lawyers, educators, bankers/financiers, inde-
pendent businesspersons, corporate executives, farmers/ranchers, gov-
ernment officials/agency representatives, labor officials/representatives,
and homemakers.
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Insider Representation on the Board. A ratio-scaled measure is constructed
as the number of board members who are physicians with active privileges
at the hospital, divided by the total number of board members.
CEO Voting Privileges on Board. A score of zero on this dummy-coded
measure indicates that the hospital CEO does not have voting privileges
on the board, and a score of one indicates that the hospital CEO does
have voting privileges on the board. Hospitals that score zero may still
permit the hospital CEO to have nonvoting (ex-officio) status.
Limit on Board Member Terms. A score of zero on this dummy-coded
measure indicates that a hospital places no limit on board member terms,
and a score of one indicates that a hospital does place a limit.
Board Member Compensation. A score of zero on this dummy-coded
variable indicates that no compensation is offered to board members,
and a score of one indicates that compensation is offered. This measure
excludes travel reimbursement from the definition of compensation.
Emphasis on Strategic Activity. This dummy-coded measure indicates
whether or not in the past twelve months strategic issues have occupied
most of the board’s time. Topics classified as strategic issues include
mergers, joint ventures, strategic planning, and competitive position.
The measure was coded zero if strategic issues did not occupy most of
the board’s time and one if strategic issues occupied most of the board’s
time. Note that a score of zero does not indicate that strategic issues
were not important agenda items but merely that they were not the
most important.
